Who cares what the people think? Revisiting David Miller’s approach to theorising about justice by Baderin, Alice et al.
Who cares what the people think? 
Revisiting David Miller’s approach to 
theorising about justice 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Baderin, A., Busen, A., Schramme, T., Ulas, L. and Miller, D. 
(2018) Who cares what the people think? Revisiting David 
Miller’s approach to theorising about justice. Contemporary 
Political Theory, 17 (1). pp. 69­104. ISSN 1470­8914 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296­017­0136­9 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/79483/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41296­017­0136­9 
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan UK 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Critical Exchange 
 
Revisiting the appeal to ‘what the people think’ in David Miller’s                     
theorising about justice 
 
Introduction 
David Miller’s methodological approach to theorising about justice, articulated most                   
explicitly in ​Principles of Social Justice (1999) but informing his work up to and                           
including the recent ​Strangers in Our Midst (2016), takes people’s existing beliefs and                         
sentiments – ‘what the people think’ – to play a fundamental constitutive role in the                             
development of normative principles of justice. In this critical exchange, Alice Balderin,                       
Andreas Busen, Thomas Schramme and Luke Ulas subject differing aspects of this                       
methodology to critique, before Miller responds. 
Alice Baderin questions the focus on supposed ‘fundamental principles’ within                   
Miller’s account of what the people think. Baderin claims that Miller assumes a                         
hierarchical relationship between persons’ fundamental principles and specific political                 
judgements, such that the former can be used as a ‘critical mirror’ for the latter.                             
Empirical evidence from moral and political psychology, however, does not bear out                       
this hierarchical relationship: for example, rather than working up from fundamental                     
principle to specific judgement, people often seem to ‘work backwards’, amending their                       
underlying principles to fit their surface judgements. In order to justify the prioritisation                         
of principles within an account of what the people think, Miller must appeal to values                             
external to public opinion. 
Andreas Busen proposes an understanding of ‘what the people think’ that moves                       
beyond a tally of individuals’ expressed or demonstrated beliefs (as detailed in the                         
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empirical studies Miller cites in ​Principles of Social Justice in particular) to a kind of                             
‘social knowledge’ embedded in a society’s practices and institutions. Understood in                     
this way, ‘what the people think’ can come apart from what given individuals think and                             
express about justice, and it can then be possible to get a firm critical grip on existing                                 
individual beliefs without needing to bring in theoretical resources that the society, at a                           
collective level, does not recognise. Busen sees this as a promising route forward, but                           
not one without costs. 
Thomas Schramme draws a comparison between Miller and John Stuart Mill in                       
order to highlight the question of what Schramme calls ‘external checks’ on what the                           
people think. External checks are kinds of normative filters, which might be either                         
formal (concerned with the way public opinion is formed) or substantive (concerned                       
with the content of that opinion). While a methodological approach that appeals to                         
what the people think seemingly ought to employ only formal checks, Schramme sees                         
in Miller’s approach an appeal to substantive checks, namely a proper understanding of                         
the ‘nature’ of particular social relationships. In fact, however, Schramme also                     
understands this substantive check to be successfully incorporated within Miller’s                   
approach, because the precise nature of social relationships is not settled definitively by                         
the philosopher, but rather is itself up for public debate. 
Luke Ulas suggests that although Miller wants to test his contextualist theory of                         
justice by way of appeal to data concerning what the people think, those data cannot in                               
fact vindicate the theory; they do not necessarily show that ‘the people’ think                         
contextually about justice, since they are also consistent with disagreement about                     
justice at a fundamental level. Moreover, even if we grant that the data do successfully                             
test Miller’s theory, it does not follow that agreement about justice at the level of                             
fundamental principle will lead to agreement at the level of political prescription. If, on                           
the other hand, we countenance the possibility that what the people think is not what is                               
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contained in Miller’s theory, Ulas claims that it would not be clear how to proceed, since                               
Miller’s approach seems both to appeal to the constitutive value of what the people                           
think, and to consider there to be independent reasons to think contextually about                         
justice. 
In responding, Miller clarifies aspects of his approach, reaffirming his                   
commitment to appeal to what the people think in doing political philosophy, and                         
contrasting this with a flawed but popular ‘Armchair View’ of the practice, in which                           
philosophers supposedly ‘come fully equipped’ to determine how political concepts                   
ought to be understood and applied. The Armchair View cannot explain why                       
philosophers disagree, and it cannot protect against biases. While Miller’s approach                     
inevitably has an ‘Armchair component’, in his initial development of a theory of justice,                           
the confirmation of that theory by way of public beliefs avoids the shortcomings of the                             
Armchair View. 
 
 
Prioritising principles 
Whilst appeals to ‘what people think’ are commonplace in political theory, systematic                       
treatments of evidence about popular attitudes are rarer – as is deeper reflection on the                             
rationale for engaging with public opinion. David Miller’s work is the most notable                         
exception to this pattern (especially Miller, 1999, Chapter 3). Miller has integrated                       1
theorising about social justice with a wide range of data about popular attitudes, as well                             
as discussed at length the value of an empirically informed approach. Here I focus on                             
one key feature of Miller’s treatment of public opinion: his claim that political theorists                           
should uncover the ‘fundamental principles’ that structure common attitudes (Miller,                   
2002, p. 7). I suggest that the prioritisation of general principles over specific                         
1 Other important exceptions are Swift, 2003; Walzer, 1994 and 2007; Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007. 
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judgements plays a key role in Miller’s account. Specifically, it seems to offer an                           
appealing strategy for reconciling an interpretive approach to political theory with the                       
critical purpose of theorising about justice. On Miller’s account, we can select among                         
the diverse components of public opinion and correct popular errors or biases, whilst                         
remaining within the parameters set by its most basic commitments. In other words, we                           
use public opinion as a critical mirror on itself. This strategy is initially appealing: if we                               
care about public attitudes, surely what should count are people’s most general and                         
fundamental beliefs. 
However, I argue that Miller’s approach is ultimately flawed, because it rests on                         
some problematic empirical assumptions about the shape of public attitudes.                   
Specifically, Miller assumes a hierarchical picture of public opinion in which general                       
principles play a foundational role, when recent work in moral psychology shows that                         
principles, specific judgements and empirical beliefs combine in more complex ways to                       
structure popular attitudes. In prioritising principles over concrete judgements, without                   
regard to empirical evidence about which is psychologically more basic, Miller implicitly                       
relies on normative commitments that are independent of public opinion. The                     
contribution proceeds in three parts. First, I note the complex role that public opinion                           
plays in Miller’s work and clarify the focus of this contribution. Secondly, I show how                             
Miller’s treatment of public opinion prioritises general principles over specific                   
judgements. Finally, I argue that this move rests on an empirically problematic picture of                           
the shape of popular attitudes. 
Three methodological ideas are of central importance to Miller’s work and recur                       
throughout his writings on justice and nationality. First, he emphasizes the need for a                           
theory of social justice to be informed by popular attitudes. Secondly, he argues that                           
justice is plural and contextual: ‘the relevant principle will depend on what is being                           
distributed, by whom, and among whom: especially on the kind of relationship that                         
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exists between the people among whom the distribution is occurring’ (Miller, 2007, p.                         
14). Thirdly, he underlines that a theory of justice should offer feasible prescriptions for                           
real world politics: it must be more than ‘a piece of utopian wishful thinking’ (Miller,                             
2003, p. 356. See also Miller, 2013). 
Thus Miller’s commitment to public opinion is closely intertwined with both his                       
contextual pluralism and a concern with political feasibility. In ​Principles of Social                       
Justice​, the overall direction of argument seems to run from empirical evidence about                         
public opinion to a pluralist account of the demands of justice. In other words, a theory                               
of social justice should take a pluralist form in order to reflect the shape of popular                               
attitudes. However, in more recent work, Miller places less emphasis on public opinion                         
as the foundation for his pluralist theory (for example, Miller, 2007, Introduction). For                         
the purposes of this contribution, I focus on those moments in Miller’s work in which                             
the commitment to public opinion is basic. On this account, the role of a theory of social                                 
justice is to render popular views consistent and coherent: ‘a theory of justice brings out                             
the deep structure of a set of everyday beliefs that, on the surface, are to some degree                                 
ambiguous, confused, and contradictory’ (Miller, 1999, p. 51). In other words, political                       
theorists are engaged in an essentially interpretive exercise whose parameters are set by                         
popular views. 
It is important to distinguish this view of the status of public opinion from an                             
epistemic account, on which public opinion is a useful tool for helping us to get closer                               
to a truth about justice that is ultimately independent of what people think. Instead, the                             
claim is that popular attitudes, suitably corrected or edited, are constitutive of the                         
demands of social justice (on the epistemic/constitutive distinction, see Swift, 2003).                     
This constitutive view can usefully be seen as a member of the broader family of                             
idealising response-dependence theories of moral value. Such theories maintain that                   
moral values are constituted or brought into being by human attitudes or responses. At                           
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the same time, however, they eschew a crude or simple form of subjectivism, because                           
they insist that only ​some attitudes or responses count: those formed under specific                         
conditions or free from certain biases or empirical errors (for example, Johnston, 1989). 
The promise of Miller’s approach lies in combining an interpretive method with                       
the critical stance of theory in relation to prevailing beliefs. But, as with other idealising                             
response-dependence theories, challenges arise in steering this middle course. First,                   
there is a problem of disagreement. Given a complex set of competing ideas about what                             
is just, rather than a singular public opinion, how are we to identify the attitudes that                               
purportedly constitute the correct normative account? Secondly, what are we to say to                         
cases of widespread public support for abhorrent practices such as slavery? If public                         
attitudes fix the demands of justice, on what basis do we identify these attitudes as                             
unjust? 
These worries about Miller’s account parallel a more general critique of                     
idealizing response-dependence theories that has been formulated in a particularly                   
powerful way by David Enoch (2005). How, Enoch asks, can we motivate the idealisation                           
away from (or selection among) actual attitudes, without implicitly appealing to                     
attitude-independent moral commitments? The most obvious answer is that the                   
idealisation is needed to track the moral facts in a reliable way. However, this epistemic                             
argument is not available to theorists who hold that an agent being disposed to value X                               
or to regard X as right or just ​is what makes X valuable, right or just. Enoch draws a                                     
useful analogy here with using a watch to tell the time: 
The reading of the watch tracks the time – which is independent of it – only when all                                   
goes well ... So there is reason to make sure – by idealizing – that all goes well...Had the                                     
time depended on the reading of my watch, had the reading of my watch made certain                               
time-facts true, there would have been no reason (not this reason anyway) to “idealize”                           
my watch and see to it that the batteries are fully charged. In such a case, whatever the                                   
reading would be, that would be the right reading, because that this is the reading would                               
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make it right. (Enoch, 2005, p. 764) 
On the one hand, any account that treats justice as constituted by ​actual opinion will be                               
extensionally inadequate: it will be insufficiently determinate in many cases and will                       
leave us unable to condemn clearly oppressive practices in contexts in which they are                           
widely endorsed. On the other hand, we need a convincing response to the ‘why                           
idealise’? challenge that does not illicitly appeal to the ability of the theory to track                             
opinion-independent facts about justice.  2
Miller is acutely aware of the first horn of this dilemma. Thus he emphasises that                             
political theory should identify ways in which public opinion is incoherent, biased or                         
empirically ill-founded. In particular, he argues that we can select among competing                       
views, and disregard many exclusionary attitudes and practices, by seeking out the                       
fundamental principles that underlie public attitudes. Hence Miller distinguishes on a                     
number of occasions between ‘people’s concrete judgements about particular                 
institutions or practices...[and] the underlying principles that inform these judgements’                   
(Miller, 2002, p. 7). Crucially, he suggests that it is the latter to which political theorists                               
should attend in developing an account of the demands of justice. This approach, he                           
argues, leaves ‘plenty of scope for theories of justice that aim to be coherent, empirically                             
sound and impartial in ways that popular opinion often is not, ​and yet can be justified to                                 
people by appeal to basic beliefs that they already hold​’ (Miller, 2003, p. 353). Thus, as                               
Miller describes the task of developing a theory of justice, we must explore: 
…how far differing views about what justice requires can be reconciled by showing that                           
they stem from ​shared beliefs at a deeper level​. My aim in this book is to discover ​the                                   
underlying principles that people use when they judge some aspect of their society to be                             
just or unjust, and then to show that these principles are coherent, both separately and                             
when taken to together. (Miller, 1999, ix). 
Here we can see a potentially powerful response to the ‘why idealise’ challenge. Public                           
2 See Schramme (this exchange) for related discussion of the problem of ‘substantive checks’. 
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opinion is comprised of multiple elements at different levels. Thus to build a theory that                             
reflects what people ​really ​think, we should set aside the more superficial aspects of                           
their views and focus on the most fundamental commitments. In this way, we can                           
resolve the tensions and failings to which public opinion is often subject, by drawing on                             
resources from within public attitudes at a more basic level. 
One kind of worry we might have about this approach is that the general                           
principles people espouse are not always morally more attractive than their concrete                       
beliefs and practices (Galston, 1989, p. 125). A second objection, which I focus on here, is                               
that public opinion does not behave in the orderly manner implied by Miller’s account.                           
The following passage illustrates Miller’s view about the relationship between                   
principles, facts and particular judgments in popular thought: ‘[Public] beliefs might                     
rest on erroneous factual assumptions – they might apply a principle to a situation                           
thinking that it had features A, B, C, whereas in fact it has features D, E, and F (if they                                       
knew that, they would apply a different principle)’ (Miller, 2003, p. 352). Similarly, Miller                           
argues that it is important to understand the bases of people’s distributive preferences                         
in order to ‘help us to predict what will happen if the circumstances alter, or if the                                 
people whose behaviour we are trying to analyse receive new information’ (Miller, 1999,                         
p. 49). For example, he suggests that if people support inequality on incentive grounds,                           
their beliefs or behaviour are likely to change in response to new information about the                             
effectiveness of incentives, whereas their commitment to inequality will be unmoved if                       
it is based instead on a principle of desert. 
Recent work in moral psychology points to two problematic assumptions about                     
the structure of public opinion within the common-sense picture outlined by Miller.                       
First, empirical research challenges the idea that our particular judgements are formed                       
by the application of more general principles to which we are more firmly committed.                           
For example, individuals will recruit either consequentialist or deontological principles                   
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depending on which supports their preferred moral judgement in a specific case (Ditto                         
et al., 2009, p. 329). Research also shows that individuals sometimes hold firm to their                             
judgements about particular cases, even when the facts of the case are manipulated so                           
that the principles that purportedly justify the judgements no longer apply. For                       
example, when asked about the morality of incest, people tend to say that it is wrong                               
because it leads to harmful consequences. However, when presented with cases of                       
incest that are carefully constructed such that no negative consequences can possibly                       
arise, respondents continue to insist that it is wrong – suggesting that their initial                           
judgement was not, in fact, grounded in the harm-based principle brought forward to                         
justify it (Haidt, Björklund and Murphy, 2010).  3
Secondly, psychological research undermines Miller’s assumption that empirical               
beliefs intervene between general principles and particular judgements and are                   
susceptible to correction that leads, in turn, to the alteration of the judgements. Instead,                           
our normative judgements often shape both the content of our empirical beliefs and the                           
manner in which we assess the empirical evidence. For example, in one study                         
participants were given a description of a man who walked out of a restaurant without                             
paying – either because he found out his daughter had been in an accident and forgot                               
to pay when leaving in a hurry, or because he tried to get away with stealing when he                                   
could. Those presented with the second ‘high blame’ scenario recalled the price of                         
dinner as significantly higher a week later, with the degree of initial blame impacting the                             
extent to which the size of the bill was exaggerated (Ditto et al., 2009, p. 318). More                                 
generally, research has found that people employ less rigorous standards for the                       
evaluation of preference-consistent than preference-inconsistent information (Taber             
and Lodge, 2006). The crucial implication of this body of evidence is that we cannot                             
3 I do not endorse Haidt’s strongest claims about the general inefficacy of moral reasoning. It is                                 
sufficient for the purposes of my argument that moral judgements are ​sometimes                       
psychologically prior to any more general principles brought forward to justify them. This                         
weaker claim is accepted even by Haidt’s critics (see, for example, Jacobsen, 2012). 
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make any straightforward counter-factual claims about what people ​would think if they                       
were to appreciate their empirical mistakes. To do so is to neglect the complex ways in                               
which our normative judgements and empirical beliefs are interrelated. 
Moral psychologists have drawn a parallel here with the different reasoning                     
patterns of barristers and judges. Miller, in the passages cited previously, assumes that                         
public opinion operates according to a judge-like model, in which we ‘work forward’ to                           
combine facts and principles in order to reach whatever judgement they seem to                         
support. However, a range of empirical evidence supports the view that we sometimes                         
(unwittingly) ‘work backwards’, like barristers in an adversarial system: ‘people (like                     
attorneys) often have a preference for reaching one conclusion over another, and these                         
directional motivations serve to tip judgment processes in favour of whatever                     
conclusion is preferred’ (Ditto et al., 2009, p. 310). 
Whilst recent experimental work has focussed primarily on individual ethics,                   
there is evidence of similar patterns of thought in the political domain. For example,                           
studies of US and UK public opinion have consistently revealed widespread hostility                       
towards inheritance tax (IHT). Yet, at the same time, most people strongly espouse the                           
value of equality of opportunity (see, for example, http://www.electionstudies.org). It                   
seems then that many people fail to recognise the policy implications of their ​own                           
deeper values. According to the model suggested by Miller, we might correct this error                           
in public attitudes, whilst remaining true to public opinion at a deeper level. In other                             
words, there is a sense in which the public should or would support IHT, if they                               
properly understood the significance of their principled commitments. Thus the                   
political theorist can advocate for IHT from ​within the terms of public opinion. But                           
again empirical evidence challenges this move. For example, participants in a UK                       
qualitative study often began by critiquing IHT on the grounds that it takes money away                             
from people who have worked hard for it all their lives. Yet when this desert claim was                                 
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challenged, by pointing out that inheritances represent an unearned windfall from the                       
point of view of the recipient, participants did not question their position. Instead, they                           
immediately sought some other grounds for their opposition to IHT, for example by                         
shifting from individuals to families as the deserving entity (Lewis and White, 2006, p.                           
27). This suggests that popular opposition to IHT may be more basic than any more                             
general normative principle brought forward to justify it. 
A brief look at some evidence about the behaviour of public attitudes reveals that                           
a hierarchical picture of public opinion – on which superficial concrete judgements are                         
shaped by the application of more basic general principles together with empirical                       
beliefs, and are susceptible to change when these prior beliefs are challenged – is                           
untenable. In some cases there is evidence that the specific judgements are more                         
robustly held. In other instances there simply seems to be no answer as to which of                               
principles or judgements is psychologically more basic (for further discussion, see                     
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). This, in turn, suggests a fundamental problem with Miller’s                     
initially appealing way of reconciling an interpretive approach to political theory with                       
the critical function of a theory of justice. If a focus on the general principles that                               
structure popular attitudes cannot be supported as an account of what people ​really                         
think at the deepest level, then how can it be justified – except as a claim about what                                   
they ​ought to think? In consistently prioritising popular principles over judgments,                     
without regard to the question of which is psychologically more basic, Miller implicitly                         
relies on normative commitments that are independent of public opinion. 
 
In a collection of essays exploring David Miller’s political philosophy, Bell and de-Shalit                         
nicely capture what Miller is looking for in a theory of justice: ‘a pluralistic, critical, and                               
practical theory of justice that navigates between the extremes of complacent relativism                       
and Platonic liberalism’ (Bell and de-Shalit, 2003, p. 8). I have argued, however, that                           
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Miller faces a serious challenge in the way in which he employs public opinion to steer                               
this course. In order to avoid the first extreme, Miller must make idealising moves away                             
from actual opinion. However, he then confronts the problem of adequately motivating                       
this process of idealisation without implicitly appealing to a domain of                     
response-independent ‘Platonic’ normative facts. I identified a potentially promising                 
response to this challenge in Miller’s account of the way in which political theory can                             
work up public opinion, by identifying the principles that underlie sometimes                     
objectionable and often confused particular judgements. Since much of political theory                     
is dedicated to the search for broad theories or principles, it is tempting to approach                             
popular attitudes in a similar way and to locate ‘real’ public opinion in people’s most                             
general commitments. However, I argued that the prioritization of principles rests on a                         
hierarchical picture of the structure of public opinion that is empirically untenable. This                         
leaves Miller unable to justify the priority of public principles, except by appeal to                           
values external to public opinion. A wider message of the paper is that evidence about                             
how people think, as much as what they think, is crucial in addressing the problem of                               
the role of public opinion in political theory. 
 
Alice Baderin 
Nuffield College, New Road, Oxford 
alice.baderin@nuffield.ox.ac.uk 
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What the People Think… and What the Philosopher May Propose                   
Beyond It 
 
David Miller’s political philosophy is marked by a fundamental methodological tension,                     
or maybe even a puzzle. While, on the one hand, Miller holds that political philosophy                             
should be based on the normative beliefs of its addressees (i.e., ‘the people’), he                           
simultaneously insists that theories thus conceived are in no way relativistic or                       
conventionalist, but may rather provide a critical perspective on ‘what the people think’.                         
How might this possibly work? Drawing on what I take to be methodologically relevant                           
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aspects of Miller’s work, I will first try to show that the puzzle is real and present a                                   
detailed account of it, in order to then, in a second step, offer a potential solution to the                                   
puzzle. I will end by discussing some methodological consequences resulting from this                       
solution and what to make of them in terms of an overall assessment of Miller’s method. 
 
The puzzle 
Let us start with the first part of the puzzle. Miller famously argues for and accordingly                               
identifies his own work as “empirically grounded political philosophy” (Miller, 2008a, p.                       
553). Probably the most prominent example of this kind of philosophy is his ​Principles of                             
Social Justice (PSJ)​, in which he argues “that empirical evidence should play a significant                           
role in justifying a normative theory of justice” (Miller, 1999, p. 51). Yet, the fundamental                             
belief that normative theorising must be informed by empirically verifiable normative                     
beliefs of its addressees can be traced as far back as ​Social Justice​, where he argues that                                 
the analysis of people’s real-life usage of political concepts represents an “indispensable                       
starting-point” for political theory (Miller, 1976, p. 2). Miller has elaborated on his                         
method by variously distinguishing it from modern-day Platonism (e.g. Miller, 1999, pp.                       
52-53) or a “Starship Enterprise view” of political philosophy, which holds that normative                         
principles should be formulated by philosophers independently of any particular social                     
or political context (Miller, 2008b, pp. 30-1). Miller seems to reject such methodological                         
positions for at least two reasons. The first concerns the practical force a theory may                             
possess: Miller thinks that political philosophy should “contain ideas that people                     
engaged in real-world politics can take up and act upon” (Miller, 2008b, p. 30) –                             
something which principles that abstract entirely from the ‘real world’ are extremely                       
unlikely to achieve (cf. Miller, 2013, pp. 234-8). The second reason is epistemological: if                           
the principles proposed by the philosopher are supposed to both be derived entirely                         
independently from the real world and still have normative force, he must claim to                           
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possess “a special kind of knowledge not available to other human beings” (Miller,                         
2003a, p. 13) – a position Miller finds “even more difficult to defend today than it was in                                   
Plato’s time” (Miller, 1999, pp. 52-3). 
While all of this underlines why, for Miller, the normative beliefs of the                         
addressees of political philosophy must play a constitutive role with regard to                       
theory-building, it is precisely this methodological stance which has drawn                   
considerable criticism, and in particular charges of relativism or conventionalism (e.g.                     
Swift, 2003). Miller, however – and this leads us to the second part of our puzzle –                                 
explicitly rejects this criticism and stresses that building a theory on ‘what the people                           
think’ does not necessarily mean taking into account any beliefs people might hold, but                           
rather only those “adjusted to take account of empirical error, faulty inferences, the                         
distorting effect of self-interest, and so on – that is, the deficiencies that are already                             
commonly understood to produce erroneous beliefs” (Miller, 1999, p. 56; see also Miller,                         
2003b, pp. 352-357). Similarly, Miller thinks that only those beliefs should be regarded                         
which – somewhat analogous to Rawls’s notion of considered judgments – people                       
come to hold after a certain amount of self-reflection (Miller, 1999, p. 56). Even without                             
further discussing these restrictions, they should sufficiently illustrate not only how,                     
according to Miller, a theory informed by people’s normative beliefs may still differ                         
considerably from those very beliefs, but also in which way and to what extent such a                               
theory may provide its addressees with a vantage point for critical self-reflection – even                           
though it starts out from their very own normative beliefs. Yet, it seems that Miller                             
wants to argue that in at least two ways political philosophy must be able to go even                                 
further beyond ‘what the people think’. 
For one thing, he insists that the philosopher should be able to identify where                           
people’s subjective normative judgments go amiss. In ​PSJ ​Miller argues that the                       
principles he identifies in people’s beliefs about justice are “​appropriate to different                       
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modes of human relationship”, or, in a slightly different formulation, that “it must be                           
possible to show that the principle is ​fitting or ​relevant in one social context but not in                                 
another” and that this is in fact “more than a merely empirical connection” (Miller, 1999,                             
pp. 32-4, my emphasis). However, unless we assume that the social relationships in                         
question are themselves constituted by people’s beliefs about justice (an idea which                       
Miller himself rejects as circular (Miller, 1999, p. 33)), I think this aggravates rather than                             
eases the methodological tension which we started out from: For if Miller wants the                           
connection between principles and social contexts to have the kind of objective                       
normative force implied in the quotes above, he would seem to have to fall back upon                               
an ‘external’ source of normativity, that is, one that is independent of ‘what the people                             
think’ (cf. Honneth, 2012 for a similar observation). 
Very much the same problem also seems to be present in the second way in                             
which Miller thinks philosophy should be able to transcend ‘what the people think’. The                           
philosopher should be able, Miller holds, not only to critically assess the way people                           
apply the principles they currently hold, but also to propose principles that differ from                           
the former (cf. Miller, 2003b, p. 352). Yet, if a theory’s normative content is to at least                                 
partly transcend the ​status quo of ‘what the people think’, we need to know where the                               
respective normativity is coming from. I think that we can safely assume that Miller                           
doesn’t want to make an exception and allow for Platonic theorizing here. And, indeed,                           
he seems to hold that even the ‘utopian’ aspect of theory-building should somehow be                           
constrained by people’s existing normative beliefs when he says that “what people now                         
believe about justice tells us a good deal about what they could freely come to believe,                               
especially if we assume that the society they will be living in has many features in                               
common with our own” (Miller, 2003b, p. 352). However, the last part of that quote                             
seems to suggest that here, too, Miller is referring to aspects of the societal context as                               
potential restrictions on which principles – existing or utopian –may be considered as                           
16 
 
‘fitting’. Yet, if this is the case, then this raises the same questions as before, namely in                                 
what way particular forms of social relationship represent an independent source of                       
normativity, and what this means with regard to the connection between normative                       
principles and those relationships? 
 
The solution? 
When Miller elaborates on the connections between principles and modes of                     
relationship in ​PSJ​, he unambiguously states that they “are not entailments”: a particular                         
form of relationship does not logically necessitate a particular principle of justice, but                         
rather makes the latter “fitting” insofar as the specific nature of the relationship                         
“naturally expresses itself” in it (Miller, 1999, p. 35). While I would suggest that we may                               
infer from this that Miller does not ascribe any kind of inherent normativity to particular                             
forms of social relationship, this still does not seem to provide us with a sufficiently clear                               
idea about what precisely makes principles ‘fit’ them. We may, however, get further                         
clarification from Miller’s critical assessment of Jerry Cohen’s (2003) influential claim                     
that any given principle is ultimately derived from a fact-independent principle                     
grounding it. Not surprisingly, Miller’s Anti-Platonism leads him to reject this claim, and                         
to instead propose that “even the basic concepts and principles of political theory are                           
fact-dependent” and, more specifically, that political philosophy should take into                   
account and be responsive to “facts of political life – everything we know about human                             
beings and human societies” (Miller, 2008b, pp. 29-31). Rather than holding that facts                         
entail normative principles, Miller suggests, we may characterize the relation between                     
the two as one of “presuppositional grounding”: While we cannot go directly from facts                           
to principles, the former can lend plausibility to the latter. Miller illustrates this by way                             
of musing about how we might explain to someone that the fact of human                           
self-consciousness grounds the liberty principle, and suggests: “This is just to remind                       
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our interlocutor of some very familiar facts about human experience, and to show how                           
it is those facts that bring principles like the liberty principle into play – if the facts were                                   
otherwise there would simply be no reason to propose such a principle” (Miller, 2008b,                           
p. 36). 
But how do I ‘show’ someone that a certain fact grounds a principle? In order for                               
me to be able to do so, it would seem that we need to ascribe the same (or at least                                       
sufficiently similar) meaning to the fact in question. Take, for instance, the idea that                           
children should not be allowed to work (or at least not nearly the same hours as adults):                                 
while we might be able to agree on some sort of objective definition of ‘children’ (say,                               
anyone below the age of 16), whether or not we also find this claim normatively                             
acceptable will depend on our respective understanding of what being a child means.                         
This understanding, however, is likely to differ considerably depending on the social                       
(and historical) context we are situated in – a conclusion which I gather Miller, given his                               
contextualist outlook, would have to agree with. What this implies, or so I would like to                               
suggest, is that the grounding relation between facts and principles, as Miller presents                         
it, is not objective, but rather best understood itself as the product of social practices,                             
which is ‘stored’ in social norms and institutions as a kind of ‘social knowledge’. As                             4
such, it is neither objective nor reducible to subjective beliefs. By socialization through                         
and taking part in social practices, people learn what kind of meaning is ascribed to facts                               
(and thus which principles those facts may ground); yet, surely this doesn’t mean that                           
their subjective beliefs will always or necessarily match what they have learned                       
(otherwise there would, among other things, not only be no need to convince others of                             
principles, but also no resources for social change). 
How might this help with our initial puzzle? First of all, I would submit that we                               
can now give a more precise account of ‘what the people think’. Even though, to my                               
4 For a recent attempt to develop a theory of justice based on this kind of normative foundation                                   
(and the extent to which this represents a Hegelian enterprise), see Honneth, 2014. 
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knowledge, Miller does not make this distinction himself, I think we may sensibly                         
distinguish between ‘what the people think’ as some sort of average of people’s                         
individual normative beliefs (as expressed in the (quantitative) empirical studies on                     
which Miller draws in ​PSJ​) and ‘what the people think’ as the kind of social knowledge                               
(re-)produced in social practices which I have just elaborated on (which it is certainly                           
more difficult to reveal through (even qualitative) empirical studies which take                     
individuals as their objects of inquiry). If I am correct in my assumption that the kind of                                 
grounding Miller posits as the link between facts and principles is situated not on the                             
level of individual beliefs, but on the level of ‘what the people think’ in the latter sense,                                 
this provides us with an explanation as to where Miller gets the normativity from that                             
allows him to go beyond people’s existing normative beliefs (which we can now see are                             
just one kind of ‘what the people think’): by referring to the social knowledge found in                               
the social practices, norms, and institutions of a society, Miller is able to both criticize                             
individual beliefs and judgments (to the extent that they are incompatible with that                         
social knowledge) and propose principles even beyond the ones people currently hold                       
(to the extent that the social knowledge allows for grounding those principles in given                           
facts) – all without having to bring in ‘external’ normative criteria. 
Let me illustrate this by taking yet another look at the argument Miller presents                           
in ​PSJ. In claiming that his three principles of justice correspond to three forms of                             
relationship, Miller explains, he is appealing to “norms of appropriateness”, and more                       
specifically to what he calls “the ‘grammar’ of justice’” (Miller, 1999, p. 35). Recall that I                               
have been arguing that what Miller says about the grounding relation between facts and                           
principles also describes his account of the connection between forms of relationship                       
and principles of justice. Now, I submit that what Miller is referring to here is precisely                               
the kind of normative social knowledge I just discussed. Miller also seems to make it                             
clear that the respective norms are not reducible to subjective beliefs, when he                         
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concedes that “there is not much that can be said to someone who wants to pry justice                                 
loose from these moorings [i.e., the “norms of appropriateness”] and present an entirely                         
context-free theory” (Miller, 1999, p. 35). While the philosopher cannot, or so I read                           
Miller here, prove that applying a certain principle to a given form of relationship is                             
objectively wrong, he can point out that insisting on this principle runs contrary to (and                             
insofar comes down to putting oneself outside of) the norms implicit in the social                           
practices and institutions of the society in question. 
 
The cost of the solution 
If any of this is convincing, it might not only provide a plausible explanation of how                               
Miller can both build his theory up from a strictly contextualist vantage point ​and                           
justifiably claim considerable critical force for it, but thus also make his method more                           
attractive to people who may, in principle, share those two desiderata, but have found                           
them to be incompatible. While I’m personally very sympathetic to Miller’s approach, I                         
would like to end here by briefly pointing out three consequences that I think come                             
along with opting for Miller’s method. Put differently, I fear that solving our                         
methodological puzzle might come at a cost. 
First, by choosing to employ Miller’s method the philosopher would seem to                       
have to restrict himself to ‘immanent critique’ (as it is often ascribed, among others, to                             
Michael Walzer (1987); see Stahl 2013 for a systematic account of ‘immanent critique’).                         
To be sure, he would still be perfectly able to criticize and theoretically point beyond                             
the ​status quo he finds in a given society. However, since, as we have seen, the                               
normative foundation for this is the normativity he finds within the social practices,                         
norms and institutions of the society in question, this would obviously limit the scope of                             
his critique. 
Just how much it would limit it depends on how one deals with the second                             
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consequence I have in mind. While I have not really touched upon this yet in my                               
discussion of Miller’s account of how facts ground principles, a lot seems to depend on                             
what kinds of facts we are talking about. Up until now I have taken the different forms of                                   
relationship Miller is talking about in ​PSJ to be ‘facts’ in the sense that they ‘exist’ within                                 
particular societies. However, Miller himself variously speaks of “modes of ​human                     
relationship” (Miller, 1999, p. 32; my emphasis), which seems to indicate that the thinks                           
that these ‘facts’ obtain universally. What difference does this make? Given what we                         
have heard about the grounding relation between facts and principles, it seems                       
plausible to me that facts which obtain universally are at least ​candidates for grounding                           
universal principles (while facts which only obtain locally are not). This seems to be                           
what Miller has in mind when he distinguishes between objective basic human needs                         
(which on his account ground universal human rights) and much more particular                       
societal needs (which ground local citizenship rights) (Miller, 2007, ch. 7). At first sight                           
this would seem to imply that there are indeed instances where the philosopher’s                         
critique can be universal in scope. However, since Miller explicitly holds that facts do                           
not ​entail principles, a fact’s obtaining universally is obviously not sufficient for                       
grounding a principle. Rather, the meaning ascribed to this fact must also be universal –                             
that is, there must be some sort of ​universal social knowledge of the kind I have shown                                 
to be essential for Miller’s notion of grounding. In contrast to the relatively                         
straightforward task of showing that certain facts obtain universally, determining                   
whether the latter is also the case seems to be much more difficult. Establishing whether                             
there is indeed universal meaning ascribed to certain facts will, for instance, probably                         
involve having to bring in historical, sociological, ethnographic and other perspectives.                     
This is not to say that such an undertaking cannot but fail, but just to point out how                                   
much more work is required by opting for Miller’s method – in comparison, for                           
example, to doing ‘Platonic’ philosophy. 
21 
 
Unfortunately, the third consequence I would like to point out might make                       
things even more complicated. As I have already briefly mentioned, while there might                         
be rather straightforward ways of finding out ‘what the people think’ on an individual                           
level, it seems to me that establishing the second kind of ‘what the people think’ I have                                 
outlined may be considerably more difficult. As I cannot go any further into this here, I                               
will restrict myself to pointing out what seems to me a particularly difficult aspect. Even                             
if the philosopher finds a way to establish a reliable account of the normative social                             
knowledge within a society, I think that he cannot be agnostic about the way this social                               
knowledge has come about. There is, after all, the very real danger that the currently                             
dominant social norms, institutions and practices result from hierarchical power                   
relations, ideology or the exclusion of certain people or groups – which the philosopher                           
runs the risk of confirming on the level of theory if he takes the social knowledge he                                 
finds in a society as his central source of normativity. Of course, this is by no means a                                   
new methodological challenge, but has, for instance, always been at the centre of                         
debates about the appropriate method for doing social philosophy (cf. Pedersen, 2012).                       
My point here is simply that this challenge is also one that I don’t think can be avoided if                                     
one opts for Miller’s method. 
Once again, I do not think that the costs attached to Miller’s method outweigh its                             
benefits. But I think that in choosing our method, we should know what we are getting                               
into – and, given that I have only touched upon what I take to be the implications of                                   
Miller’s way to doing political philosophy, I am not sure whether I could blame someone                             
for taking the easy (read: Platonic) route, or at least trying to take a shortcut.  
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Mill and Miller: Some thoughts on the methodology of political                   
theory 
 
In this contribution, I want to discuss David Miller's methodology of political philosophy                         
by way of relating it to ideas of another renowned philosopher, John Stuart Mill. I                             
believe both thinkers share a common purpose, which is to build a more realistic and                             
contextualised political philosophy. They achieve this through including empirical                 
evidence about the normative beliefs of real people in their methodology. I will agree                           
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with Mill andMiller that normative theory can and indeed should be based on empirical                             
evidence about ‘what the people think’. However, I will point out a potential problem                           
when allowing "external checks", as I will call them, to such normative beliefs. External                           
checks are indeed needed for correcting distorted normative beliefs when using them                       
for theoretical purposes of devising a normative theory. But checks might also be used                           
to exclude unwanted substantive normative beliefs. I believe that this could undermine                       
the very methodology of “what the people think.” We should include what the people                           
really think, not what we as theorists like people to think. 
I would like to be as clear as possible about the philosophical problems and                           
options here, as I will pursue a contentious line of thought. First, it should be obvious                               
that people are themselves not always clear about what they think, especially as regards                           
complex normative issues. In these cases, philosophers might not be able, for pragmatic                         
reasons, to use the suggested methodology. More importantly, philosophers might also                     
want to query what it is that the people ​really think. I understand this notion to pose a                                   
methodological problem of the social sciences. Alternatively, someone might like to                     
introduce a normative requirement into the philosophical model, for instance by saying                       
that what people really think has to be authentic, rational, morally valid, or something                           
the like. However, the more we idealise our model towards what the people ​should                           
think, the more we lose grip of our starting-point. The quarrel, which is also visible in                               
the pages of this special issue, is similar to debates about different theories in ethics,                             
more objectivist models versus more subjectivist (or mind-dependent) models. I will                     
commit to the latter model without any further argument. I would only like to stress that                               
an objectivist model undermines the very idea of the methodology under scrutiny here.                         
It misses its point, because it does not require reference to what the people think. 
In his essay ​Utilitarianism​, John Stuart Mill introduces a test that is supposed to                           
decide between higher and lower pleasures (Mill, 1861: 211). If all or nearly all people                             
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who are acquainted with two pleasures prefer one over the other, then this is the                             
higher, or more valuable, pleasure of the two. Brushing over several issues here, we                           
might be allowed to say that Mill in effect introduces an empirical test for determining                             
what is good or valuable. He grounds values on facts; facts about the evaluative or                             
normative beliefs of real people. Mill himself uses the test only for a very restricted                             
range of normative matters, namely those that concern basic elements of human                       
happiness. But we can use his idea as a springboard for more general methodological                           
remarks on the use of normative beliefs in the construction of a theory of justice. 
The philosophical debate that followed in the aftermath of Mill's considerations                     
mirrors the debate regarding the use of empirical evidence about normative beliefs of                         
“the people”, or more specifically about justice beliefs, for generating normative                     
principles. Many philosophers believe it is simply a nonsensical idea to use evidence                         
about what people prefer or value to establish (aspects of) normative theories. This is                           
because these philosophers believe that what people find valuable is quite distinct from                         
what is ​really valuable. Obviously, a lot hinges on whether the two aspects – what                             
5
people find valuable and what is valuable – can actually be separated. Once we                           
undermine the belief in a reality of values or of a correct conception of justice,                             
independent of people’s evaluations, Mill's methodology looks much less dubious. I                     
6
5 ​Adam Swift, for instance, claims: "If we're thinking about what justice means – ​really means, not                                 
'means in contemporary debate' – then it is a mistake to give public opinion any deeper or more                                   
constitutive role." (Swift, 1993, p. 19 (his emphasis)) Swift agrees with Jerry Cohen here, who                             
similarly, and repeatedly, refers to the "​correct principles of justice" (e.g. Cohen, 2000, 131;                           
Cohen, 2011, p. 227). 
6 ​Cohen himself states that the theory of justice he believes to be ​correct​, i.e. egalitarianism,                               
cannot claim to be more justified than contenders. "(…) I hold the egalitarian views that were                               
instilled in me (…) even though I ​know ​that I hold them ​because ​they were instilled in me, and                                     
that less radical views with no less good epistemic credentials might have been instilled in me”                               
(Cohen 2000, p. 11 (his emphases)). A lot hinges on the phrase "no less good epistemic                               
credentials". If Cohen believes that there can be a correct theory of justice and maintains, at the                                 
same time, that even the correct theory does not bear any better epistemic credentials, then he                               
seems to subscribe to a straightforward Platonist theory, where the truth of a normative idea is                               
wholly independent of our epistemic access to it.  
25 
 
will hence pursue the idea of granting findings about what the people think a                           
constitutive role in normative theory, especially in political philosophy (see also                     
Schramme, 2008). 
It should be stressed that Mill does not simply refer to facts in order to establish                               
normative conclusions. He rather refers to facts about individual normative beliefs and                       
their prevalence within a community. So he does not draw values from brute facts, but                             
from evaluations of people. There is neither a jump from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ involved,                               
nor a definition of normative terms, such as “desirable”, by reference to non-normative                         
terms, such as “desired.”  Desires, for Mill, are ​evidence​ that something is desirable. 
7
Mill is also not guilty of another error, namely that of simply taking for granted                             
the normative beliefs of people. He is adamant about excluding preferences based on                         
distortive influences, such as extremely detrimental living conditions. The question of                     
how to filter actual beliefs, as it were, so that they can be transferred into valid evidence                                 
for establishing normative ideals, is another big issue I cannot adequately deal with                         
here. At least partly it poses a pragmatic problem for the actual performance of such                             
tests, which has been dealt with to some extent, if perhaps not sufficiently, in the                             
literature on social justice research (Swift, 1999; Liebig & Lengfeld, 2002), and also in                           
philosophy (Elgin, 1996). But it also poses the problem of how to avoid bias towards                             
certain substantive normative beliefs, as mentioned at the beginning of the essay. This                         
problem will be my concern in the remainder. 
To address the widespread objection of a mere conventionalism, criteria for                     
assessing the validity of normative beliefs are required. These criteria can be formal, as                           
suggested by Mill's attempt to exclude distortive influences on, say, the voluntariness or                         
7 The latter would be a naturalistic fallacy, as conceived by Moore; the former would be a                                 
violation of Hume's law. Although these are often conflated, they are, strictly speaking, not the                             
same. 
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authenticity of preferences. External checks could also be substantive, i.e. concerned                     
8
with the content of a choice. For instance, purely egoistic attitudes could be excluded                           
9
from considerations regarding principles of justice. Now, it seems that only formal                       
checks of beliefs would be preferable from the methodological point of view defended                         
here. To determine the normative ideal in advance, before we actually find out what                           
people think, would mean sliding back into an idealised account of theory construction.                         
Checks are only needed to make sure that the empirical data, i.e. normative beliefs, are                             
undistorted. Filters should not be used to establish the alleged "correct" outcome of an                           
empirical test of normative beliefs. 
Yet there is a general problem regarding the methodology lurking here: Once we                         
allow any filtering of normative beliefs in order to convert them into considered beliefs                           
for theory construction, we might unwittingly introduce substantive checks, which                   
undermine the very idea of starting from the basis of actual normative beliefs in the first                               
place. I believe it is this problem of external checks – as I want to call it – that occupies                                       
David Miller in his account of “what the people think.” It is indeed a thorny question                               
whether formal checks can ever be enough for the construction of a plausible                         
normative theory. Perhaps we cannot avoid substantive constraints, at least as far as the                           
very basic elements of a normative theory are concerned, such as basic elements of                           
happiness (Mill) or principles of justice (Miller). 
Miller uses ‘what the people think’ to help establish three different principles of                         
justice: distribution according to equality, according to desert, and according to need.                       
He claims that these principles guide people in different contexts, which vary relative to                           
8 I take it that formal constraints would include some facts, as well. For instance, if someone                                 
believes that we must not inflict pain on sentient beings, but also believes that, say, guinea pigs                                 
cannot experience harm, then this would be a formal error, according to my usage of the term. 
9 'External' is here used as shorthand for 'external to a subjective point of view'.  
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different relationships that people have. The principle of equality is found in the                         
context of nation states, desert in instrumental associations, and need in communities                       
that are based on solidarity (Miller, 1999, p. 26ff.). 
There is some ambiguity as to how those principles are derived. Either Miller                         
wants to argue that relationships are the basis for principles of justice or that                           
10
principles are derived from the normative beliefs of people in different contexts, i.e. in                           
different relationships. This ambiguity might actually be desired, as it might well be                         
11
both influences – lived relationships and justice beliefs – that determine normative                       
principles. Indeed, I do believe the ambiguity is Miller's way of providing external                         
checks on normative beliefs without dismissing them in favour of external criteria                       
alone. He therefore wavers between grounding his normative principles in                   
12
relationships themselves and normative beliefs about the adequate criteria of                   
distribution in particular relationships or contexts. This is not a shortcoming of his                         
methodology; it is, instead, an important ingredient, because Miller wants to allow for                         
the normative beliefs of people to go wrong. 
To check beliefs against relationships is not, however, simply a formal check of                         
beliefs, for example in terms of their voluntariness. If people believe it would be right to,                               
say, allocate medical resources on the basis of desert, they would miss an adequate or                             
fitting criterion, because the basis of healthcare is not to be found in a relationship                             
10 ​"My aim is to identify the ​underlying principles of justice that spring directly from the various                                 
modes of relationship (…)" (Miller, 1999, p. 26 (his emphasis)) 
11 ​"What grounds do we have for asserting these connections between principles of justice and                             
modes of association? We may begin by looking empirically at the judgments and behaviour of                             
people when they allocate resources in different contexts." (Miller, 1999, p. 34) 
12 ​"Contextualists claim that there is a relationship of appropriateness between context and                         
principle that is primitive in the sense that it cannot be explained by appeal to some more                                 
fundamental principle that applies universally." (Miller, 2002, p. 11) 
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based on voluntary association. The specific bonds between people that determine                     
13
principles of justice do not allow for just any possible interpretation, because bonds                         
come with normative boundaries and commitments. 
Still, I would argue that Miller's methodology does not imply that there is only                           
one adequate distributive principle per type of relationship. The nature of the                       
relationship provides an external check of subjective beliefs about the best normative                       
principle in this context, but it does not by itself determine these principles. It rather                             
restricts the options by excluding unfitting principles of justice. If checks were more                         
restrictive and would lead to one determinate answer, subjective beliefs of real people                         
would actually be methodologically superfluous. Normative principles, in that case,                   
would be the outcome of the right interpretation of relationships. I have argued that the                             
nature of the relationship rather provides a range, but only a range, of adequate                           
principles, which are selected according to what the people think.  
14
Miller's methodology is therefore not conventionalist, in contrast to what is                     
sometimes asserted. He allows for external checks of normative beliefs, and hence does                         
not simply take normative beliefs for granted when devising his theory. “What the                         
people think” is not fixed once and for all; and is it contestable through a debate about                                 
the nature and fittingness of relationships in particular contexts. Hence Miller even                       
shows a way of including substantive external checks of subjective normative beliefs                       
13 ​"We can discover ​systematic connections between contexts and principles of justice, so that                           
whenever we find a society that includes human relationships of type C, we can say that those                                 
relationships ​ought​ to be governed by principle P." (Miller, 2003, p. 350 (my emphases)) 
14 ​"We cannot hope to show that a mode of relationship ​necessitates the use of a certain principle                                   
of justice; but we can and must establish more than a merely empirical connection." (Miller, 1999,                               
p. 34 (his emphasis)) To be sure, Miller does occasionally seem to give the nature of a relationship                                   
a stronger role: "Once the relationship is defined, we (as competent users of the concept of                               
justice) know the criterion by which dues should be calculated, whether need, desert, equality,                           
or something else." (Miller, 1999, p. 33) "(…) the claims that contextualists make about the                             
contextual validity of principles of justice are themselves objective and universal in character"                         
(Miller, 2002, p. 12). On these occasions, his claim sounds more like a                         
one-particular-principle-per-type-of-relationship point of view. 
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without undermining the methodology itself – in opposition to the idealising                     
methodology. In his theory, checks are provided by the nature of particular                       
relationships. The interpretation of the nature of different relationships in different                     
contexts is a task for political theorists, if not only for them. This allows for a normative                                 
theory to be in conflict with actual normative beliefs and at the same time to claim                               
superiority in normative terms. Still, it would need to be possible to eventually bring                           
people to endorse those theoretical, external viewpoints, as they cannot be established                       
as normatively superior on purely theoretical grounds. Hence there is a (non-vicious)                       
circularity between subjective evaluations and theoretical considerations.  
15
But how can we ever assess whether actual beliefs or some theoretical                       
consideration are preferable on normative grounds? If people come to endorse the                       
latter, for instance a particular interpretation of a relationship, then there is congruence                         
between normative theory and what the people think; but if they have not, or not yet,                               
endorsed them, on what grounds could a political theorist claim that people's normative                         
beliefs are wrong and ought to be changed? This seems impossible, unless we introduce,                           
yet again, an independent normative criterion, which then seems to amount to a claim                           
about correct normative principles, and we would be back at the point where we                           
departed from idealised and less realistic theories. As long as we stay within a                           
(non-vicious) circle of to-and-fro between subjective beliefs and theoretical claims, I                     
believe we cannot assume the normative superiority of any possible point within this                         
circle. Real errors in normative beliefs, within the methodology put forward here, can                         
only be formal errors, such as coerced attitudes; but there cannot be substantive                         
15 ​"So, it is a condition for a theory’s being valid that it should be possible for people to come to                                         
accept it and live according to its principles. Clearly, this is not the same as saying that they must                                     
accept it ​now​. But unless one thinks that as far as ethics go people are blank slates on to which                                       
more or less anything can be inscribed, it does constrain the content of the theory. Putting the                                 
point more positively, what people now believe about justice tells us a good deal about what they                                 
could freely come to believe, especially if we assume that the society they will be living in has                                   
many features in common with our own." (Miller, 2003, p. 352 (his emphasis)) 
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normative errors. To be sure, this does not prevent normative theorists from criticising                         
people’s normative beliefs and trying to convince them otherwise. But I believe taking                         
on this role of a public critic requires a change in purpose: from devising a normative                               
theory that is in line with people's beliefs here and now to a proposal of what people                                 
might think, if they follow the political philosopher's suggestion. The latter is a proper                           
task of political theory, but it needs to be distinguished from other tasks. In other words,                               
methodological concerns should be determined by purposes. In this paper, I have                       
defended a view, which I deem to be in line with Miller's methodology, where “what the                               
people think” is the most significant ingredient when establishing normative principles                     
for here and now. 
Thomas Schramme 
University of Liverpool, UK 
t.schramme@liverpool.ac.uk 
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 Are the people thinking what Miller’s thinking? 
For David Miller, the job of the political philosopher is to uncover and present back to                               
people “the deep structure of a set of everyday beliefs that, on the surface, are to some                                 
degree ambiguous, confused and contradictory,” with the aim of producing “a clearer                       
and more systematic statement of the principles that people already hold”. It follows                         
that a theory of justice is to “be tested, in part, by its correspondence with evidence                               
concerning everyday beliefs about justice” (1999 p. 51). The theory of justice that Miller                           16
understands to be embedded in the ‘deep structure’ of everyday beliefs in the societies                           
with which he is concerned in ​Principles of Social Justice (hereafter ​PSJ) is a                           
contextualist one. Miller identifies three relational contexts, each of which have their                       
own distributive principle. A context of solidaristic community (like a family or, says                         
Miller, a nation) brings with it the distributive principle of need; a context of                           
instrumental association (like a market economy) is governed by the principle of desert;                         
and the context of citizenship brings with it the principle of equality. Call this the                             
‘principle-to-context framework’. 
The justification for taking an interpretative approach that I will focus on here is                           
an epistemological one. For Miller, if the philosopher reaches conclusions about the                       17
‘truth’ of justice radically divergent from public opinion: 
…then we must ask whether the criteria by which the philosopher distinguishes truth                         
from falsehood are the same as those used by the ordinary person. If they are the same,                                 
why is there such a radical divergence between the philosopher’s conclusions and those                         
of the ordinary person? If, by contrast, the philosopher appeals to different criteria, what                           
warrant does he have for thinking that they lead to objective truth? How can he                             
16 But only “in part”. I return to this below.  
17 This is not the only justification – another is related to the notion that any principles of justice                                     
the philosopher offers should be plausibly ‘action-guiding’ (see for example Miller, 2013).  
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distinguish between a mere conviction that the truth is to be found by the method of                               
inquiry he favours, and a warranted belief that this is the case? (1999, p. 52) 
These are rhetorical questions; Miller believes there are no good answers. But do the                           
people in fact think what Miller thinks they think? I will here first suggest that we have                                 
reason to at least be doubtful about that. Moreover, even if the people do indeed                             
endorse the principle-to-context framework, there remains room for dispute about                   
what follows from the framework politically. On the other hand, if we suppose that                           
there is in fact a disconnect between what the public believes and what Miller imputes                             
to them, then it is not clear what conclusions about justice should be drawn, because                             
Miller also appears to have independent reasons to prefer his contextualist theory. 
In ​PSJ​, ​Miller refers to empirical data to ‘test’ the principle-to-context framework                       
as an interpretation of what the people think about justice. But at first blush, there                             
appears to be an obvious problem. Miller appeals to survey data (amongst other things)                           
in which respondents answer in a certain way about, for example, the place of desert in                               
judgements about just distributions. But of course, there is never ​consensus among the                         
respondents; for every majority that responds one way there is a minority that responds                           
in a different way, however much triangulation of studies is carried out. What then                           
enables the assertion that ‘the people’ think something? I understandMiller’s approach                       
here to be to draw a distinction between levels of disagreement. Although the data                           
evidence disagreement among persons, it does not follow that those persons must be                         
disagreeing about the principle-to-context framework; rather, they might simply be                   
disagreeing about how best to categorise the context at hand, or about which context                           
takes priority, while agreeing in the abstract about which distributive principles rightly                       
apply to which contexts. So, for example, disagreements in the survey data about                         
whether it is okay for an employee to use their influence to secure a job for a relative are                                     
said by Miller to evidence disagreement about whether the context that takes                       
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precedence is the familial context or the context of the instrumental association (1999:                         
36). ​The assertion that the principle-to-context framework itself is consistent with                     
public belief then survives.  18
This however is not the only possible interpretation of the data: an alternative is                           
that people in fact ​do disagree about the framework itself, and it is that deeper                             
disagreement that explains the divergent responses. The empirical data cannot resolve                     
this issue of their own interpretation. Surveys, for instance, tend merely to ask people to                             
select from given options – we do not thereby learn ​why they select the option(s) that                               
they do. Qualitative studies, in which participants’ thoughts about justice are deeply                       
probed, and which therefore provide more insight, are unfortunately less well                     
represented in the data Miller appeals to. It is possible, then, that genuine deep                           
disagreement about principle is being inappropriately rendered as merely a series of                       
misunderstandings about context, or disagreements about context priority. 
One worried about this possibility might additionally wonder why, if what the                       
public thinks rightly plays a constitutive role in determining principles of justice, the                         
empirical exercise does not come first, rather than only at the point at which                           
confirmation of a pre-constructed theory is sought. One reason potentially to worry                       
about the order in which Miller does things is that by the time we get to the hard data,                                     
there has already been considerable intellectual investment in the theory to be tested.                         
And indeed, the elements of the theory sketched in ​PSJ can be, I think, understood to                               
proceed from earlier work such as ​Market, State and Community ​(1989): the three                         
elements of that book’s title being exemplary of the three contexts of instrumental                         
18 A second possible response to the variation evident in the data is to begin by accepting the                                   
inevitable existence of principled disagreement, and then to make clear that by ‘what the people                             
think’ is meant ‘what the majority think’. This seems to be hinted at when Miller recognises the                                 
existence of those with “deviant views” (1999, p. 24), which we might interpret as those whose                               
beliefs about justice do not correspond to the principle-to-context framework. Even if we                         
assume that the number of these deviants is small, however, it’s not clear how they should relate                                 
to the society they find themselves in: if justice is constituted by what ‘the people’ think, and yet I                                     
do not think the same way, what normative authority does justice have for me?   
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association, citizenship, and community. None of us is immune to ‘motivated reasoning’                       
(see Alice Baderin’s contribution to this exchange for discussion): might there be a type                           
of confirmation bias at work in the interpretation of the data, that leads one to consider                               
that that data “stands up” the theory (1999, p. 61), rather than simply fails to falsify it? 
Perhaps this thought gets things wrong. Miller may respond that even though it                         
is true that he already had a favoured theory before consulting the ‘hard’ empirical data                             
in ​PSJ​, this does not mean that that theory was not developed in the first place via a                                   
process of social interpretation. Miller is, after all, a person in the world: he can claim to                                 
have developed his initial contextualist theory via an ongoing ‘soft’ interpretation of                       
public beliefs and sentiments, in a more Walzerian vein: from the fact he had a theory                               
before coming to consult the hard data it does not follow that that theory must have                               
been constructed, in a Platonic manner, via a process of abstract reasoning divorced                         
from existing political practice. And since Miller is a person in the world who cannot                             
help but interpret society as it confronts him, reference to the ‘hard’ empirical data                           
could never, in practice, come first. But while this may all be right, any such response                               
would also seem to amount to recognition that the ‘hard’ data in fact plays a less                               
important role in the interpretative methodology than advertised, even in ​PSJ​. We                       
should also want to knowmore about exactly what is involved in the prior, ‘soft’ process                               
of interpretation that delivers us the theory in the first place but is not explicitly                             
contained within Miller’s articulation of his methodology.  19
Suppose, notwithstanding these concerns, that the principle-to-context             
framework is indeed an accurate representation of the deep structure of collective                       
public belief. There remains the question of what can properly be said to follow, in                             
terms of specific political recommendations, as an implication of that structure. There is                         
19 In her review of ​Strangers in Our Midst​, Linda Bosniak notes that the precise method of social                                   
interpretation Miller there undertakes is unclear. While he does still “briefly cite” some polling                           
and survey data, there also seems to be a more general and underspecified attempt to “intuit the                                 
zeitgeist” (Bosniak, 2017, pp. 96-7).  
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significant scope for divergence on this secondary question, even assuming agreement                     
at that deeper level. An affinity can be drawn with the justificatory “internalism” of                           
Bernard Williams. ForWilliams, “A has reason to O only if he could reach the conclusion                               
to O by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has” (Williams, 1995,                             
p. 35). Miller may want to say something similar, perhaps: ‘Policy O is just for Society A                                 
only if it can be shown to be an implication of the deep structure of belief about justice                                   
Society A already holds’. As Williams freely admits however, “the deliberative process                       
which could lead from A’s present [motivational set] to being motivated to O may be                             
more or less ambitiously conceived” (Williams, 1981, p. 110). But given this variability of                           
‘ambition’, any number of differing actions, potentially inconsistent with each other,                     
can seemingly be shown to lie at the end of a “sound deliberative route” from persons’                               
existing motivations (Forst, 2012, pp. 30-31). Because of this, disagreement about what                       
any one person has an internal reason to do seems highly likely, even assuming                           
agreement about the contents of the existing motivational set. 
The political implications of the ‘deep structure’ of public belief can themselves                       
be more or less ‘ambitiously’ conceived. For instance, both Miller (1983) and Michael                         
Walzer (1989) have endorsed a kind of market socialism. But this is surely not the only                               
possible way to cash out the implications of the purported deep structure of public                           
belief. Even if you and I both agree that the principle of equality applies to the context                                 20
of citizenship, and the principle of desert to the marketplace, we might well not agree                             
that market socialism is a necessary implication of the confluence of those two                         
principles; perhaps a cap on top-to-bottom income ratios (something else with which                       
Miller has shown sympathy), even where companies stay in private hands, would be                         
sufficient; or perhaps something even less ambitious might be thought to do the trick.                           
20 As Brian Barry put it with particular reference to Walzer, ​“Like it or not … there is a coherent                                       
rationale for the private ownership and control of firms, based on widely diffused ideas about the                               
rights of private ownership” (Barry, 1995, p. 74) 
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In other words, it is again seemingly quite possible for persons to confront the same                             
‘data’ – here, the principle-to-context framework itself – and draw opposing                     
conclusions about it. 
What does this mean for the normative status of any first-order political                       
prescriptions Miller makes? One answer is to suppose that at ​this level, the philosopher                           
does indeed have some privileged epistemic status, and does not need to seek                         
correspondence with what the people think; if, on the other hand, the philosopher                         
remains constrained to work within the frame of ‘what the people think’, then it would                             
seem to be the case that they should resist making first-order political                       
recommendations, because it is inevitable that the people will not think one coherent                         
thing. Perhaps the best way to conceive of things here, however, is to treat the                             
philosopher as a citizen contributing to political debate like any other, offering their                         
own interpretation of the political implications of the shared deep structure of belief                         
without any pretence or requirement that that interpretation is, or will ever be, shared                           
by ‘the people’ at large. 
But what happens if the deep structure of public belief, as a matter of fact, and as                                 
I have suggested is quite possible, does not comprise the principle-to-context                     
framework that Miller has produced? I noted at the outset that Miller says a theory                             21
should be tested “in part” by its correspondence with public belief. He says that “the                             
evidence [about public beliefs] is not decisive from a normative point of view unless we                             
can say something more about why a certain mode of social relationship makes the                           
corresponding principle of justice the appropriate one to use” (1999, p. 34). Part of that                             
‘something more’ is the perceived “fittingness” between the context and the principle;                       
an independent normative appraisal. Public beliefs, however well systematised by the                     
philosopher, are not in themselves sufficient to ground justice: we must in addition find                           
21 Andreas Busen and Thomas Schramme also reflect on this question in their contributions to                             
this critical exchange.  
37 
 
justification for why the content of those beliefs is appropriate. But there is a curiosity                             
here. The normative ‘appropriateness’ of the link between a given social relationship                       
and a given distributive principle presumably remains even if it ​did not accord with                           
what the people think. Indeed, as Miller has put it:  
…it may turn out that people in [a] society that includes context C fail to apply                               
[principle] P in that context; they may not only fail to govern those relationships                           
in the way that P demands, ​they may not even recognise that P is the appropriate                               
principle to apply​. In that case, contextualists should have no hesitation in saying                         
that they [i.e. the people] have got it wrong, that the society is to that extent                               
radically unjust” (Miller, 2003, p. 351, my emphasis) 
Contextualists ​simpliciter might well be able to say this, but how can contextualists who                           
also believe in the constitutive relevance of public belief to justice do so? How can                             
Miller anticipate telling a society that the principle it endorses is “radically unjust” while                           
also being sceptical about philosophers’ epistemic capacity to reach normative                   
conclusions at “radical divergence” from those of the ordinary person? (1999, p. 52). One                           
answer for a contextualist to offer might be that it is possible to tell a society it is                                   
radically wrong about a given context of justice only when there are other contexts of                             
justice which the society gets right, and that can explain to that society why the context                               
they’ve got wrong ​is wrong ​for them​. In that way, Miller could meet his own condition                               
for a valid theory “that it should be possible for people to come to accept it and live                                   
according to its principles”, where a component of ‘possibility’ is that persons can be                           
plausibly persuaded to recognise the theory on the basis of the set of beliefs they                             
already hold (Miller, 2003, p. 352). 
There could, though, be no correct theory of justice that is ​completely divorced                         
from what the people think about justice. The reason for this is that, as we have seen,                                 
the philosopher is presumed to have no privileged epistemic vantage point – when                         
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philosophers reach the judgement that what the public believes about justice is                       
comprehensively “wrong”, the appropriate reaction is to question the warrant for that                       
judgement. The people are assumed to be competent locators of an appropriate ‘deep                         
structure’ of justice (even if, as it appears, Miller is willing to allow that they may                               
occasionally go ​partially wrong); the philosopher enters to make that structure plain,                       
and to explicate its appropriateness. But even if Miller does not think that “what the                             
people think” and what’s normatively appropriate will come fully apart in practice, the                         
analytic distinction is illuminating, because if, as I have been suggested he might be,                           
Miller is in fact wrong about what the people think, he seemingly would find himself in                               
a dilemma: on the one hand committed to the notion that the people are essentially the                               
epistemic equals of the philosopher; and on the other hand of the opinion that his                             
contextualist theory of justice is normatively appropriate, when in fact the people                       
endorse something that Miller seemingly considers objectively wrong. It is not clear                       
what the way forward would be in such a scenario – if a correct theory of justice                                 
requires both accordance with what the people think ​and an independent ascription of                         
normative appropriateness, could there here even ​be correct principles of justice? In the                         
interests of protecting the methodology from having to confront this kind of difficult                         
scenario, there is always reason to believe that it hasn’t occurred. 
Luke Ulas 
Durham University, UK 
luke.a.ulas@durham.ac.uk 
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Justice beyond the Armchair  22
The four contributors to this symposium have raised a challenging set of questions                         
about how to do political philosophy, and specifically about what kind of attention, if                           
any, should be paid to public opinion, or “what the people think.” I have wrestled with                               
these questions repeatedly but, as the commentaries reveal, so far failed to provide                         
wholly satisfactory answers. So I welcome this opportunity to try to say more clearly                           
why political philosophy, and especially theories of justice, must draw upon the best                         
available evidence about popular opinion on relevant matters. 
To start from a premise that I hope is uncontroversial, I assume that the aim of                               
political philosophy is normative: to provide theories and principles by which existing                       
social institutions, practices and policies can be appraised. This is without prejudice to                         
the question whether the upshot of the appraisal is radical, reformist or conservative:                         
political philosophy can take any of these forms. A successful theory has to meet a                             
number of conditions. If it advocates reform, it needs to show that what is proposed is                               
feasible, isn’t morally outrageous, and so forth. But part of the work that needs to be                               
done is conceptual. The theory will recommend arrangements on the grounds that they                         
are legitimate, democratic, just, freedom-enhancing etc. These concepts support                 
22 I should like to thank Margaret Moore for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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normative conclusions, but they also have descriptive components. So when a political                       
philosopher makes a claim to the effect that justice requires that practice P be replaced                             
by practice P’, this is a claim that needs redeeming. The philosopher has to show that                               
the reasons that favour adopting P’ are indeed reasons of justice and not reasons of                             
some other kind. 
So how are claims like this to be redeemed? For understandable reasons,                       
philosophers are naturally drawn to what we can call the Armchair View. The Armchair                           
View holds that the philosopher, as a competent user of whichever language he is                           
writing in, comes fully equipped to determine how various concepts are to be applied,                           
and to grasp their descriptive components. It seems to me, however, that this                         
confidence is misplaced. First, what are we to say when different Armchair Views                         
collide? The occupants of the various seats announce that justice means this, freedom                         
means that, and so on, but, as is so often the case, these pronouncements conflict with                               
one another. How can we get beyond the disagreement, as opposed to merely adding to                             
it? Second, political philosophers ought to be more self-reflective than they usually are                         
about the status of the intuitions or ‘considered judgements’ that they deploy in order                           
to justify their conceptual or normative claims. One reason is that (in Western                         
democracies anyway) their social position biases them in favour of certain views and                         
against others: like other university faculty, their political convictions are                   
overwhelmingly liberal when measured against the views of the population at large.                       23
Another is that philosophers are inevitably tempted to adjust what they take to be their                             
‘pre-theoretical’ judgements to fit the theoretical positions they have already arrived at                       
independently. To give one example, few philosophers seem willing to grant ​desert the                         
fundamental role that it plays in popular conceptions of distributive justice. A likely                         
23 For some evidence about this in the case of American academics, see Rothman, Lichter and                               
Nevitte, 2005. Among the general public 18% self-identified as liberal and 37% as conservative in                             
1999; for philosophers, the figures were 80% liberal and 5% conservative. 
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explanation is that they have already decided that the concept is problematic, perhaps                         
because they are convinced on metaphysical grounds that individuals cannot be                     
responsible for their decisions and actions in the way that they would need to be for the                                 
notion of personal desert to make sense. Now such considerations might indeed justify                         
adopting a strongly revisionary notion of desert, or abandoning the idea all together.                         
But even if this is the right answer to give at the end of the enquiry, it ought not to                                       
influence the intuitions from which the philosopher begins. This would be like                       
manipulating the data in order to hold on to a hypothesis to which you were already                               
committed. But sitting in the Armchair, it is going to be very difficult to keep one’s                               
primary intuitions uncontaminated by prior theoretical convictions. 
The implication I wish to draw is that although political philosophy unavoidably                       
has an Armchair component – I will return to this – there are good reasons for looking                                 
beyond the Armchair to vindicate conceptual claims. But where should one look? An                         
initially plausible answer is to focus on shared social practices, treating these as the                           
practical embodiment of the various concepts the philosopher is trying to elucidate.                       
This seems particularly promising in the case of justice. We grasp how justice should                           
best be understood by seeing its principles being deployed in various practical contexts.                         
Rather than ask people what they think, we should look at the rules they have chosen to                                 
adopt, for example the rules they apply when deciding how to allocate goods of various                             
kinds amongst themselves. 
In his contribution, Andreas Busen proposes moving in this direction, taking a                       
society’s ‘practices, norms and institutions’ as embodying ‘social knowledge’ that                   
transcends the beliefs of individual members, and is to that extent objective. But he also                             
highlights some potential limitations of such an approach. It will not provide an                         
adequate set of tools to criticize practices that need criticizing – especially since these                           
practices may have been shaped historically by dominant economic or political classes                       
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in their own interests. I would add a further point: we can’t tell just by looking at a                                   
practice what its guiding values are. Consider law as a central social institution. One                           
might expect to learn a great deal about justice by examining legal rules and the                             
principles that lie behind them, and up to a point this is indeed so. But the purpose of                                   
law is not simply to deliver justice; it is also guided by considerations of social stability                               
and of economic efficiency. So if one examines tort law, say, as encapsulating a form of                               
social knowledge, there can be different views (as the relevant literature reveals) about                         
how far the practice serves the end of corrective justice, and how far it is concerned                               
with the efficient allocation of costs between plaintiffs and defendants. In making this                         
point, I am of course assuming that we already know roughly what ‘corrective justice’                           
means. But if one did not – if one went to tort law to ​find out what justice meant – then                                         
one would get the wrong answer by straightforwardly extrapolating from the practice,                       
in light of the multiple purposes it serves. 
Looking instead to public opinion as a source of reliable opinion about concepts                         
like justice appears at first sight to avoid these problems. For, first, people very often use                               
these concepts for critical purposes – a good way to get at how people understand                             
fairness is often through seeing what they regard as ​unfair​; so this avoids the accusation                             
that the concepts that emerge from the beyond-the-Armchair investigation are simply                     
mirrors of the status quo. Second, there is reason to think that it’s fairness that concerns                               
them, not some other value, because that’s the word they use to express their                           
complaint. However, matters are not so simple. The evidence suggests that people’s                       
beliefs about justice, especially their more concrete beliefs, tend to be adaptive in                         
nature. If asked some question about wage fairness, for example, they may take their cue                             
from existing wage differentials as they perceive them. Moreover, the language that                       
people use to express their judgements may not be as tightly disciplined as philosophers                           
would like it to be. For example, philosophers often contrast ​desert and ​incentive                         
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justifications for inequality, but the public may not see the distinction so clearly. So they                             
might agree that policemen, say, deserve to be paid more than shop assistants, but when                             
asked why that was so, explain that no-one would join the police unless their salary was                               
higher. 
So it is important to recognize that in order to use public opinion to develop a                               
theory of justice, we must at least start with an embryonic theory that allows us to                               
identify and categorise the relevant beliefs; the Armchair cannot be dispensed with                       
altogether. This is no more of a climb-down that a scientist properly acknowledging that                           
empirical research always begins with a theory that enables the researcher to specify                         
which findings will count as confirming or falsifying the theory; the important thing is                           
that the theory ​can be falsified by the findings that emerge. In my work on distributive                               
justice, I began by sketching a theory according to which justice was a plural notion,                             
with principles of equality, need and desert being used in different social contexts. And                           
I then looked at a variety of evidence about popular beliefs to see how far these beliefs                                 
were indeed a) pluralistic and b) related to contextual variation in the way I had                             
proposed. I was able to show, for example, that in group settings people’s views about                             
distributive justice were sensitive to the character of the group they belonged to –                           
which can be experimentally manipulated in various ways – and in the direction that                           
the theory predicted. But it was not a case of the theory being straightforwardly                           
confirmed by the evidence. For example, in cases where the subjects are asked to                           
distribute resources on the basis of information about how well the recipients have                         
performed at various tasks, the theory would predict that an (inegalitarian) desert                       
principle would be used. This is indeed what we find, but there is also some pull in the                                   
direction of equality, and this needs explaining, since the relevant context is not one in                             
which we would expect that principle to apply (the participants are related only                         
instrumentally). There are various possible explanations, but one that seems promising                     
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appeals to the idea that equality can serve as a default principle even in contexts where                               
other principles are appropriate. On the one hand, it is simple to use (just divide the                               
quantity of available resources by the number of recipients) and ensures that the                         
allocator cannot be accused of personal bias. On the other hand, in the face of                             
uncertainty about who deserves what, it can serve as an injustice-minimising device (for                         
the reasoning behind this, see Miller, 1999, pp. 234-6). If these conjectures are correct,                           
the theory needs adjusting to accommodate two forms of equality: principled equality,                       
where it is intrinsically important that certain goods be shared equally by everyone, and                           
default equality, where equal distribution is used as a convenient rule of thumb, but one                             
that could readily be trumped by another principle if necessary.  24
I offer this as an example of how a theory can be open to revision in the face of                                     
evidence, despite being used as the framework that guides the search for relevant                         
evidence. But how good is the evidence itself? Both Luke Ulas and Alice Baderin raise                             
critical questions about this. Ulas draws particular attention to the problem of                       
disagreement. If people really do disagree, fundamentally, about what justice requires,                     
how can we use their beliefs to generate support for our theory?  
It is important here to analyse the kind of disagreement we may encounter when                           
surveying what the people think. One case will be disagreement that stems from                         
ideological bias. People’s more specific beliefs about what’s fair – say in relation to pay                             
differentials – are very likely to be influenced by their social position, and the felt need                               
this creates for self-justification. Social position also affects the explanatory stories                     
people tell about worldly success and failure. Here, disagreement could be avoided if we                           
24 
To illustrate, consider the practice of splitting the bill equally at the end of a meal. If I do that                                         
with a casual acquaintance, it will be because we both agree that it isn’t worth the trouble of                                   
calculating what each of us owes; but strictly speaking it would be fairer to do the calculation.                                 
That’s equality by default. If I do that with my partner, by contrast, it will be because dividing                                   
bills equally is part of what it means for us to have an equal relationship. That’s principled                                 
equality. 
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were able to place people behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Since we cannot do that,                               
we need to discount beliefs that are biased in that way, and look at what people say in                                   
cases where their own interests are not immediately involved. 
People may also disagree over the extent to which social practices should be                         
guided by justice, or by a specific form of justice. Suppose we try to explore how people                                 
judge desert by asking them what criteria they would use to allocate prizes among a                             
class of schoolchildren. It is easy to anticipate that some of the respondents might find                             
the very idea of prize-giving objectionable, thinking that it would encourages a                       
competitive attitude that they dislike among the classmates. So they will give ‘deviant’                         
responses to the questions we ask, but not because they disagree about what justice                           
would in principle require – they simply think that a particular desert-based form of                           
justice has no place in the classroom. The point here is that although we can ask people                                 
questions designed to elicit their sense of justice, we can’t guarantee that the answers                           
they give will express that sense; they may respond to some other feature of the                             
scenario we are presenting to them. 
So we need to separate normative disagreement in general, which will include                       
disagreement about which principles or values should count for most when practical                       
issues are being decided, from disagreement about justice specifically. The question will                       
then be how much disagreement of the latter kind there actually is once distorting                           
factors such as those mentioned above have been eliminated. This is an empirical                         
matter, but I am tempted to short-circuit the investigation by pointing out that we could                             
not have a concept like justice unless there was broad agreement about how it should                             
be used. To deny this, you would have to suppose that people continue to speak and                               25
25 When I speak of agreement here, this is meant to encompass the idea that the concrete                                 
principles people use depend on the social context in which they are being deployed. This also                               
helps to explain why Armchair philosophers are liable to disagree about the meaning of justice:                             
ignoring contextual pluralism, they promote a particular conception as though it exhausted                       
justice itself, overlooking or ignoring its contextual roots.  
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argue with each other about justice, while simply failing to recognize that their                         
interlocutors meant something entirely different when they deployed the concept. 
The conceptual agreement that is required is agreement at the level of principle,                         
not agreement over practical issues. That is because, when practical issues are being                         
debated, there are usually several values at stake, and much will depend on empirical                           
questions about feasibility, about the likely effects of institutional change, and so. So I                           
agree with Ulas when he says that we cannot move directly from a conceptual account                             
of justice to a political proposal like market socialism. A fully-fledged political theory is                           
likely to incorporate a number of principles as well as an account of the ‘basic structure’                               
that will best realise those principles. Getting straight about what justice means is only a                             
first step. 
Baderin makes a number of very good points about the way people’s thinking                         
about justice questions is actually likely to be structured. She points out in particular                           
that it is a mistake to see their more concrete beliefs as controlled by higher-level                             
principles. However, it is wrong to suppose that when we engage with people’s beliefs                           
from a theoretical perspective, we are just attempting to map existing beliefs as                         
accurately as possible, including the sticking points that people won’t abandon when it                         
is pointed out to them that they conflict with some principle they say they uphold. What                               
is being attempted by the philosopher is a rational reconstruction of popular beliefs –                           
what people would believe if they thought their position through with due regard to                           
logic, consistency, etc. It might be illuminating here to refer to Daniel Kahneman’s                         
influential study ​Thinking Fast and Slow​, and his idea that our mental processes can be                             
divided into two systems, one that controls our immediate responses to external stimuli,                         
and another, operating more slowly that ‘takes over when things get difficult’. Consider                         
one of Kahneman’s examples, the way that ​framing can affect how we respond to                           
choices that are substantively identical – for example, when the same numerical                       
47 
 
decision is couched either in terms of ‘lives saved’ or in terms of ‘lives lost’ (Kahneman,                               
2012, ch. 34). Our system 2 thinking allows us to see that something is amiss if we find                                   
ourselves making inconsistent decisions because of framing effects. Of course the                     
extent to which system 2 controls system 1 will vary from person to person, which also                               
means that there is no guarantee that offering someone a rational reconstruction of                         
their beliefs will persuade them to adopt it. My claim is not that once we get our political                                   
philosophy right, all citizens will actually accept it. My (somewhat less ambitious) claim                         
is that they will have reason to accept it, on the assumption that they want to be                                 
rational, and that what is being offered makes sense of a considerable part of what they                               
do actually believe. 
A question remains about the role that empirical evidence should play in                       
validating the contextual theory of justice itself. The contextual theory holds when                       
distributive decisions have to be made within a group, the appropriate principle to use                           
will depend on the kind of group it is – what type of relationship predominantly obtains                               
between members. For example, in groups whose members are instrumentally related,                     
justice requires that resources should be allocated according to (the relevant kind of)                         
desert, whereas in groups where solidarity prevails, resources should be allocated                     
according to need. Now, what is the status of these claims? They are not analytic. It is                                 
not part of the definition of an instrumentally-constituted group that its members enact                         
desert-based distributions. That their distributive practice takes this form might be a                       26
sign that the group is predominantly of such a kind, but that is another question. Nor is                                 
the connection between social context and principle of justice one of entailment. I                         
26 
See here the critical appraisal by Axel Honneth, whose charge is that ‘the respective practice                               
cannot be described without the use of categories that do not already refer to the corresponding                               
norms of justice’ (Honneth, 2012, p. 127). I believe this charge can be rebutted. Although a full                                 
description of what it means for a group to be solidaristic in nature, say, will include normative                                 
elements, such as the concern that members are expected to show for one another, the                             
description need make no reference to principles of justice specifically. 
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cannot see any way of showing that a group within which relationships are of type T                               
must on pain of self-contradiction distribute its resources according to principle P. The                         
claim as I have stated it is that P is the ​appropriate principle for the group to use, and                                     
this claim is of a type that we are familiar with in other walks of life. For example, when                                     
someone behaves towards us rudely or aggressively, there is a range of responses to the                             
behaviour that we regard as appropriate, though we could not demonstrate this to                         
someone who was unable to see it. Now I believe that almost all of us will have the                                   
intuitions that bear out these claims about appropriateness, but nevertheless they                     
cannot be self-evident. If matters were so clear cut, it would difficult to understand how                             
philosophers are able to defend (competing) claims about justice that take a universal                         
form – justice should always be understood as equality (suitably defined) or as desert,                           
say, regardless of context. My claim is that philosophers who make these claims are                           
mistaken, but I do not suggest that they are ignoring self-evident truths. So in order to                               
defend contextualism, it is necessary to appeal to empirical evidence about popular                       
opinion in order to establish that there are indeed shared understandings about justice                         
that support it. The idea is to show that people are practising contextualists, not that                             
they themselves have a fully worked-out theory to support the judgements that they                         
make. 
This is how I would respond to Thomas Schramme’s claim that there is an                           
ambiguity in my methodological approach (though not, he thinks, necessarily a                     
damaging one). ‘[Miller] wavers between grounding his normative principles in                   
relationships themselves and normative beliefs about the adequate criteria of                   
distribution in particular relationships or contexts’. As a theorist, I claim that different                         
principles of justice are appropriate within different forms of human relationship –                       
that’s a normative claim – but then I confirm this intuition (which is not self-evident) by                               
looking to see whether it is reflected in the beliefs of the people who actually inhabit                               
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those relationships. If successful, this approach will avoid the shortcomings of the                       
Armchair View. If my intuitions are idiosyncratic (or class- or gender-biased), looking at                         
the evidence will reveal this. 
There is no space here to consider all of the wider issues that this symposium has                               
raised. One concerns the scope of a theory that is developed in the way that I have                                 
proposed. Does it apply only to the societies from which the supporting evidence is                           
drawn, or can it also be used as a critical tool with respect to past or present societies                                   
whose members appear to understand justice differently? Another is how far the                       
proposed method is specific to justice, and how far it applies to all of the concepts we                                 
use for purposes of political evaluation. And yet a third is about the general aim of                               
political philosophy, and whether it is essential, as I believe it to be, that its                             
recommendations should be supported by principles that are accessible to the public,                       
where being accessible means that they connect in the right way to beliefs that people                             
already hold. 
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